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Abstract
This paper’s title is an echo of Alfred Chandler’s (2001) chronicle of the electronics industry, Inventing the Electronic Century. The paper attempts (A) a general reinterpretation of the pattern of technological advance in (American) electronics over the twentieth century and (B) a somewhat revisionist account of the
role of organization and institution in that advance. The paper stresses the complex effects of product architecture and intellectual property regime on industrial
organization and technological change. Whereas large research-oriented multidivisional firms always played a crucial role in the industry’s history, such firms
proved most adept at systemic innovation, as in the case of television. But, as
in the cases of early radio and of the IBM 360 mainframe computer, the multidivisional firm was capable of bottling up within its boundaries (often through intellectual property rights) a relatively modular architecture whose ”option value”
such firms could not fully exploit. America’s adherence to the model of industrial
research within the vertically integrated corporation arguably contributed to the
demise of American consumer electronics in the 1970s and 1980s. And America’s subsequent relative success in semiconductors and personal computers —
and in today’s converged digital consumer electronics — owes much to the specialized and ”fragmented” character of American industry, which could take fuller
advantage of competitive global value chains and of the option value of modular
architectures.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: L2, L63, N62, O33, O34
Keywords: electronics, modularity, product architecture, vertical integration.

Paper for the conference ”Has There Been a Third Industrial Revolution in
Global Business?” November 16-18, 2006, Bocconi University, Milan.

Introduction.
Talk of a Third Industrial Revolution presupposes that there has been a Second. 1 Alfred
Chandler (2006, pp. 1-2) tells us that the Second Industrial Revolution began in the
1880s, when the railroad, steamships, electricity, and the telegraph and telephone called
forth economies of scale and set in motion genuinely multinational enterprises (Chandler
1977, 1990). The revolutionary barricades were manned by a large number of integrated
multidivisional firms wielding a multiplicity of technologies. By 1930, that revolution
was over, leaving behind the infrastructure of the Industrial Century – the twentieth
century. As Chandler (2006, p. 48) reminds us, with what one suspects is a great deal of
satisfaction, 98 of the 100 largest industrial enterprises in the U. S. in 1993 had been
founded by the early 1930s.
The Third Industrial Revolution, which Chandler tends to call the Electronic or
Information Revolution, began just as its predecessor was ending. It would eventually
generate the infrastructure for the Electronic Century now upon us. Unlike the Second
Industrial Revolution, the Information Revolution bubbled up from a narrow set of
technologies – the vacuum tube, the transistor, the integrated circuit, and the
microprocessor – and thus involved a smaller set of players (Chandler 2001, p. 12). But
the organizational outcome was identical, because it would be the same kind of large
multidivisional firms that would commercialize the scientific and technological ideas of
the new century. As first movers, and occasionally fast followers, these firms developed
an integrated knowledge base from which they could launch innovative products.

1

Disclaimer: I am not actually interested in what industrial revolutions are, whether they exist, or whether these
particular ones are correctly specified. I use the terminology only as a convenient container for my narrative.
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Although a “supporting nexus” of smaller, more-specialized firms was crucial to the
success of the overall industrial enterprise, it was the multidivisional firms, not the web
of specialists, who did the heavy lifting. So long as the pioneering firms employed the
virtuous strategy of related diversification and remained on the straight-and-narrow paths
of learning the first movers had mapped out, those firms were able to enjoy economies of
scale and scope and to become the perpetrators rather than the victims of creative
destruction. But when the pioneers strayed from the path, and especially when they
succumbed to the temptation of unrelated diversification, they stumbled and fell
(Chandler 2001, 2006).
This is clearly a coherent framework for understanding the organization of
technological change, and one with a good deal of appeal. Unlike many accounts of
organization, especially those emanating from economics departments, Chandler’s
framework stresses the knowledge and economic capabilities (Langlois and Foss 1998)
that underlie production and the ways in which organization is both shaped by and shapes
such capabilities. Nonetheless, one might legitimately wonder whether an explanation
honed in the fires of the Second Industrial Revolution retains a sharp edge for the Third.
To many observers, the most recent manifestations of the Electronic Revolution, those
involving personal computers and the Internet, are notable precisely for the ways in
which they have diminished the role of the large multidivisional firm as a generator of
innovation and a repository of economic capabilities. There are still large firms with
integrated knowledge bases and economies of scale and scope; but those firms – Intel,
Microsoft, Dell, Cisco – are far more vertically specialized than firms of old; and it is far
from clear nowadays whether it is these large firm or the “supporting nexus” that tends
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the industry’s overall path of learning. One implication of this alternative view is a
discontinuity not merely between the Second Industrial Revolution and the Third but
perhaps even between the two dimensions of the Industrial Century itself, consumer
electronics and computers. In this reading, we can perhaps see the path of learning in
consumer electronics through the classic Chandlerian lens as a dance of large
multidivisional firms like RCA, Philips, Matsushita, and Sony; but understanding the
path of learning in the computer industry, especially in its more recent phases, requires an
entirely different optic.
My approach will be to steer between – or rather to recombine elements from –
these competing accounts of the Electronic Revolution.

In accord with the “new

economy” view, I will be sensitive to the ways in which changing technology and other
factors have affected the nature, role, and scope of both the multidivisional firm and the
“supporting nexus.” Indeed, I will concur in the view that the forces of the modern age
have led to a widespread “de-verticalization” of production in this and other industries,
although, as in previous work (Langlois 2003, 2004, 2007), I will locate the source of that
phenomenon less in the specific demands of digital technology and the Internet than in
the larger Smithian forces of specialization attendant on a growing economy, increasing
globalization, and an expanding base of technological knowledge. At the same time,
however, I will not consign the multidivisional firm to the dustbin of history. I will
attempt to tell a tale of the electronics industry that is fundamentally Chandlerian in
character, as it will focus on the development of technological and economic capabilities
and on the paths of learning in the industry. Like Chandler, I will see the dynamics
operating in consumer electronics and computers as essentially similar rather than as
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dramatically different. The result may or may not please Chandler himself; 2 but it will be
my attempt to walk a path of learning that he, as “first mover,” has marked out.

Capabilities and architecture.
As Chandler notes, the consumer electronics and computer industries of the twentieth
century emerged from a handful of related technologies – the vacuum tube, the transistor,
the integrated circuit, and the microprocessor. These technologies arguably qualify as
general-purpose technologies (GPTs), and their general-purpose character arguably
accounts for the rapid pace of economic growth in and because of the electronics sector
(Helpman 1998; Langlois 2002a). At the same time, however, these technologies became
useful only when imbedded in larger systems like radios, televisions, and computers. In
this respect, the products of the electronics industry have always been what Merges and
Nelson (1994) call cumulative systems technologies. A technology is a (complex) system
when it is composed of many parts each of which may draw on its own potentially
distinctive knowledge base; and a technology is cumulative when “today’s advances lay
the basis for tomorrow’s, which in turn lay the basis for a next round, and so on, with the
sequence often progressing very far from the original invention starting place” (Merges
and Nelson 1994, p. 7).

In industries based on cumulative systems technologies,

advances do indeed follow a path of learning.
How many of the capabilities necessary to produce a complex system will reside
within the boundaries of a (large multidivisional) firm and how many will be left to other

2

Chandler (2005, p. 595n1) vents his annoyance at a related attempt by Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin (2003) to
create a new synthesis of business history in light of present-day organizational trends. He accuses them, perhaps
a bit unfairly, of imagining a world dominated by small specialized firms and of neglecting the importance and
visibility of global capitalism. So far I have escaped Chandler’s notice, or at least his line of fire.
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(perhaps more specialized) firms? And – what is not the same question – which pieces of
the system will a (large multidivisional) firm produce itself and which will it buy from
other (perhaps more specialized) firms? That specialization has its benefits is of course
an idea that predates Adam Smith. George Richardson (1972) recast the issue in terms of
economic capabilities: the greater the extent to which the complementary capabilities
needed to produce a (complex systems) product emerge from distinct bases of
knowledge, the more expensive it will be to manage those capabilities effectively within
a single organization. This suggests, with Chandler, that successful integrated knowledge
bases will consist in capabilities that are related to one another. But how related? And
how integrated?
In making their case against broad patent scope, Merges and Nelson (1990, 1994)
point out the value of a process of innovation in which many different agents can
participate, since competition in ideas can lead to rapid trial-and-error learning (Nelson
and Winter 1977).

In the case of a complex systems product, patents on crucial

components can make it costly to assemble a state-of-the art system; but broad patents
covering large parts of the overall system can be especially damaging, as they allow the
patent holders to block or retard the innovative activity of others. The same logic
suggests that, even in the absence of explicit patent protection, broad and tightly
integrated capabilities within a few first movers can have a similar effect. Baldwin and
Clark (2000, 2006) make the argument more formally when they suggest that a given set
of innovative activities – of economic experiments – are more valuable in a market than
in a (large multidivisional) firm: the value of a portfolio of options in always greater than
the value of an option on a portfolio.
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A complex systems product is underlain by an architecture: a set of parts and a
way of fitting those parts together. An integral architecture is one in which the parts
depend on one another in complex and often unpredictable ways: the system is a tangle of
spaghetti. By contrast, a modular architecture is one that regularizes the dependencies
among the parts, forcing them to interact only in relatively formalized and predictable
ways (Langlois 2002b). Such modularity reduces the costs of specialization and permits
actors to participate with only a limited repertoire of capabilities. In the case of a
complex systems product, a certain degree of modularity is inevitable to the extent that
the parts of the system call on a wide set of dissimilar technological and economic
capabilities.
Although the degree of modularity of an architecture is an important determinant
of organizational structure, there is no one-to-one mapping between the architecture of a
complex systems product and the industrial structure under which that product is actually
produced. For example, a large multidivisional firm can choose to produce internally
most of the components of a more-or-less-modular systems product in order to
appropriate rents or to maintain the kinds of first-mover advantages Chandler describes.
In such a case, the full option value of the architecture may lay untapped (Baldwin and
Clark 2006). Alternatively, the causality may run in reverse: vertical integration may
persist precisely because the firm or firms controlling the architecture are relatively
insulated from competition by intellectual property protection or industrial structure
(Langlois 2003). It is competition that unleashes the option value of a (potentially)
modular architecture. Moreover, architecture is itself a decision variable that may be
under the control of a Chandlerian first mover, and such a firm may choose a more-
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integral system design as part of a strategy of rent appropriation or because the conditions
of competition do not require it to do otherwise.
On one side of the ledger, then, is the benefit to modularity and vertical
disintegration of modular innovation (Langlois and Robertson 1992), the rapid trial-anderror learning that comes from tapping into the larger universe of external capabilities
that lie outside the boundaries of the firm. On the other side of the ledger, however, is
the potential benefit to integration and integrality of architectural innovation (Henderson
and Clark 1990), improvements that come from reorganizing the list of parts and the way
the parts fit together. It is the importance of integrative capabilities that resonates in
Chandler’s discussion of paths of learning. In the Second Industrial Revolution, first
movers emerged and grew into large multidivisional firms because of their ability to
create and manage the architecture of a new product (or, more typically, process) the
parts for which were not initially available cheaply through arm’s-length transactions
(Langlois 1992b, 2003; Langlois and Robertson 1995). Many writers continue to insist
on the importance of integrative capabilities even in today’s world of greater modularity
and vertical disintegration. Now as then, there remains a need for a systems integration
capability (Pavitt 2003), which is why, in general, successful firms “know more than they
do” (Granstrand, Patel, and Pavitt 1997; Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt 2001), that is,
firms retain internally capabilities not only in systems integration but also in fabricating
many of the parts of the system – even though they may actually source those parts from
others.
What can we learn from all this? The present-day theory of capabilities has much
to say about paths of learning; but it does not prescribe that those path be trodden by
-7-

large multidivisional firms alone – or, for that matter, by small highly specialized ones.
Rather, it provides a toolkit I will use in nailing together an account of how the
infrastructure of the electronic century came to be organized.

Consumer electronics.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the strands of technology that would lead to what we
now think of as consumer electronics were not yet electronic: they were
electromechanical (radio) or strictly mechanical (sound and video reproduction). With
John Fleming’s invention of the vacuum-tube diode in 1904, followed quickly by Lee de
Forest’s invention of the triode “audion” in 1906 (Hong 2001, pp. 119-120), a genuinely
electronic paradigm began to emerge.

What would spur the development of that

paradigm, however, was not the prospect of consumer demand but rather
telecommunications, notably military telecommunications. 3

The radio.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Guglielmo Marconi had demonstrated the
possibility of wireless telegraphy using a spark-gap transmitter. By the turn of the
twentieth, he had incorporated in Britain what would become Marconi's Wireless
Telegraph Company, along with a series of similar companies around the world,
including one in the United States. Although there were other players, Marconi was a
formidable competitor who generally refused interconnection with other networks;
American Marconi held a virtual monopoly on wireless telegraphy in the U. S. A major

3

Unless otherwise noted, the next few paragraphs draw generally on Maclaurin (1949), Aitken (1985),
Graham (1986), and Chandler (2000).
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use for wireless was communication with ships at sea, something that became more
significant as war broke out; the war also thrust wireless into the land-to-land business as
the warring factions cut each other’s undersea telegraph cables. Understandably, this
technology did not escape the notice of the Navy, which in the U. S. effectively
nationalized American Marconi for the duration.
The spark-gap transmitter was a relatively crude device that spewed
electromagnetic radiation indiscriminately over the spectrum.

Marconi continued to

depend on this technology, however, as he concentrated on the geographical expansion of
his empire at the expense of technological development.

By the First World War,

American companies, along with some in Europe, had developed electromechanical
approaches to the transmission of cleaner waveforms. But these companies, including
GE, were in the equipment business not the radio-transmission business. At war’s end,
the Navy, fearing dominance of a crucial military technology by what was ultimately a
British company, wanted badly to nationalize wireless telegraphy. 4 When it became
clear that Congress wouldn’t go along, the Navy changed tack and pushed for the
“Americanization” of American Marconi through an organizational alliance with GE
(Maclaurin 1949, p. 103; Howeth 1963, chapter 27). GE would become the major
shareholder in a new entity – the Radio Corporation of America – that would absorb most
of the assets of American Marconi, including personnel and patents. The new company
would then provide radio services using American (GE) equipment.

4

The case in favor of nationalization was pressed at a 1919 Congressional hearing by the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, one Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Aitken 1985, p. 386n42). A year earlier, the
case against had been eloquently argued at another hearing by a rising star in the American Marconi
organization, David Sarnoff. Navy ownership, Sarnoff argued, would have a chilling effect on
innovation (Graham 1986, p. 36).
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RCA received its Delaware charter in 1919. Within the next two years, a number
of significant players joined in with capital and technology: AT&T, United Fruit, and
Westinghouse. In part, RCA attracted these partners because of the systemic nature of
the service. In the case of AT&T, for example, RCA needed access to AT&T’s lines as
feeders for its service. The more compelling motive, however, was intellectual property.
RCA was a way to pool the many patents that would be needed to produce the complex
systems products of radio transmission and reception. 5

Seeing vacuum tubes as

important for amplifiers in its wire-based transmission system, AT&T had purchased the
de Forest triode patent. Marconi had acquired the Fleming diode patent. Before the U. S.
entered World War I, development of vacuum-tube technology had been at a standstill as
the two firms dueled in court in a classic case of blocking patents 6 (Merges and Nelson
1990, pp. 892-893; Aitken 1985, pp. 248-249). By 1920, RCA controlled both patents.
United Fruit, which had developed wireless technology for use with its extensive fleet of
ships, contributed patents and facilities, thereby also ridding itself of concerns far away
from its core competences. The last piece of the puzzle was Westinghouse, America’s
other electrical-equipment giant, which contributed among other things the rights to the
crucial heterodyne principle. 7 As a result of this agglomeration, as well as numerous
international cross-licensing agreements, “RCA obtained rights to over 2,000 issued

5

A 1919 Navy memorandum had “found that there was not a single company among those making
radio sets for the Navy which possessed basic patents sufficient to enable them to supply, without
infringement, … a complete transmitter or receiver.” (Quoted in Maclaurin (1949, p. 105).)
Maclaurin (1949, p. 97) also reports that there were 20 major issues of patent infringement between
AT&T and GE between 1912 and 1926.

6

During World War I, the U. S. Government effectively inactivated all radio-related patents for the
duation and assumed financial responsibility for any resulting infringements (Reich 1977, p. 214).

7

The heterodyne technique involves adding two waveforms in order to produce two new signals at
different wavelengths. The superheterodyne receiver became the eventual dominant design in radio.
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patents, including practically all the patents of importance in the radio science of the day”
(Maclaurin 1949, p. 107). It remains an open question why all this took the form of an
equity joint venture rather than a contractual patent pool alone, though most
commentators point to the role of the government in pushing for the development of what
they saw as a national champion in radio technology (Maclaurin, pp. 100ff). In the words
of founding chairman Owen D. Young, RCA for its part “was anxious to create an
industry in which competition would be ‘orderly and stabilized’” (Maclaurin 1949, p.
105).
Wireless telegraphy was RCA’s original business model. Everyone recognized
that vacuum tubes would eventually be important in this enterprise, even if they were not
initially capable of providing the power levels of the electromechanical alternator.
Vacuum tubes could producer a cleaner waveform, something of great use if one were to
modulate the signal to transmit and receive sound and voice not just dots and dashes. But
few at the time saw any potential in sound broadcasting. There was, however, one crucial
exception, and even he underestimated its potential.

David Sarnoff was a Russian

immigrant who rose through the ranks from office boy and key operator to a management
position at American Marconi, where he had conceptualized what he called a “Radio
Music Box” (Graham 1986, p. 32). The business model was to make money from selling
receivers to a mass market while providing broadcasting content free of charge as a kind
of advertising. American Marconi had no interest in the idea; but, when Sarnoff moved
over to RCA, he eventually found a warmer reception.
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Year

Number

Value

1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941

100
550
1,500
2,000
1,750
1,350
3,281
4,428
3,827
3,420
3,000
3,806
4,084
6,027
8,248
8,065
6,000
10,500
11,800
13,000

$60,000
136,000
358,000
430,000
506,000
425,600
690,550
842,548
496,432
300,000
200,000
300,099
350,000
370,000
500,000
537,000
350,000
375,000
584,000
610,000

Table 1
Sales of home broadcast radio sets (in thousands).
Source: Maclaurin (1949, p. 139.
We are accustomed nowadays to the rapid penetration of new technologies – the
DVD, the cell phone, the Internet – and maybe accustomed to thinking of such rapid
penetration as unique to our age. But the speed with which the American home adopted
the radio was on a par with anything our age has to offer; the penetration of the personal
computer proceeded at a snail’s pace by comparison. 8 Sarnoff apparently thought that
the total cumulative demand for radios would be about a million sets at $75 each. In the
event, the industry sold $60 million worth in the first year (1922) alone; $136 million in
8

In the first two years after introduction, IBM sold a total of 750,000 personal computers, and that
represented 26 per cent of the market for PCs (Langlois 1992, p. 23).
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1923; and $358 million in 1924. RCA’s own sales were $11 million in 1922; $22.5
million in 1923; and $50 million in 1924. (See Table 1.) Over the next decade, 60 per
cent of American homes came to possess radio receivers (Scott 2001). Sarnoff saw his
sales staff burgeon from 14 people in 1921 to 200 nationwide offices the next year – and
saw himself catapulted into the position of vice-president and general manager (Graham
1986, pp. 38-39).
Since radio constitutes what economists now call a hardware-software network,
what actually catalyzed the takeoff of radio was less RCA’s entrance into receiver
manufacturing than the impetus RCA’s entry gave to the launching of broadcast stations.
The broadcast of voice and music probably goes as far back as 1906, all in the context of
amateur radio, which constituted a large “hobbyist” sector akin to what would later drive
the early personal computer industry.
By the 1920’s wireless had become the hobby of thousands of young
Americans. No other modern industry has been supported by so many
ardent participants. It is hard today [i. e., in 1949] to recapture the spirit of
this period: amateur clubs were started in every state, comprising all types
and classes – schoolboys, professors, electricians, and ex-servicemen who
had operated radios during the war. Radio was a new toy, not only
technically interesting, but the means by which people could reach out into
unknown regions and communicate with new-found friends. (Maclaurin
1949, p. 112.)
In 1920, Westinghouse set up a radio station (under the call sign KDKA) at its East
Pittsburgh plant to cater to this ham radio market and earn some cheap good will. The
effect was to alert other commercial enterprises, including AT&T and RCA, to the
potential that already existed because of amateur radio (Aitken 1985, pp. 469ff.). The
number of broadcast stations on the air leapt from five in 1921 to 556 in 1923, leveling
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off to 765 by 1940 (Sterling and Kittross 1978, cited in Scott 2001). Most early stations
did indeed broadcast for free to earn goodwill (and maybe sell receivers); but by 1927,
the tide had turned in favor of the advertising-revenue model.
Most of the first commercial producers of radio receivers were hobbyists and
garage-shop operations. Between 1923 and 1926, by one estimate, an average of 187
new firms entered the business every year, most of whom failed quickly (Maclaurin
1949, p. 134). Despite its formidable capabilities, RCA was not in a good position to
compete on price with the garage-shops, as it had costly and often unwieldy supply
relations with GE and Westinghouse for parts. As the architecture of the radio receiver
matured, RCA and its owner-suppliers struggled with the problem of standardization for
parts like vacuum tubes (Graham 1986, pp. 39-40). Like personal computers decades
later, radios were in fact relatively inexpensive to assemble; and increased
standardization and the emergence of a dominant design quickly eroded the rents one
could earn from selling assembled receivers. RCA initially tried to extract rents at the
level of the vacuum tube, since this was indeed the high-tech core of the radio; but they
did this by insisting on full-line forcing and exclusive dealing in their arrangements with
distributors, practices of dubious value that were in any event struck down by the Federal
Trade Commission (Graham 1986, p. 40; Chandler 2001, p. 19). In the late 1920s,
RCA’s market share had slipped to between 18 and 20 per cent (Chandler 2001, p. 21).
By 1927, however, courts had affirmed the validity of RCA’s dominant patent
portfolio, which opened the door to what would be the company’s strategy for the next
three decades: package licensing. Chandler (2001, p. 18) takes pains to point out that by
the end of the roaring ‘twenties, garage-shop radio manufacturers had faded away in
- 14 -

favor of significant firms founded before 1920 in related technologies like batteries,
automotive equipment, telephone equipment, or electrical equipment. 9

The superior

capabilities of incumbents may indeed have won out in the end; but in this case the
demise of the newcomer was mostly the result of RCA’s patent policy: only 25 large
assemblers would initially have the rights to RCA’s patents, in exchange for a sizeable
royalty of 7½ per cent plus back damages for infringement. 10 The licensing was a
package in the sense that an assembler had to pay royalties on RCA patents for all
relevant parts of the radio even if the assembler didn’t use all those parts.

E ffe c t o f R C A p a te n t lic e n s in g o n e n try in to ra d io
300

250
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E n t ra n t s
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1934

Figure 1.
Source: Maclaurin (1949, p. 134).

Although RCA did later extend the deal to others and reduce royalty demands
somewhat, it was nonetheless RCA’s control of the patent portfolio that gave shape to the

9

The two exceptions were startups Zenith and Raytheon.

10

RCA had initially wanted to limit licenses to customers whose royalties would amount to at least
$100,000, though this minimum was never enforced (Maclaurin 1949, p. 135).
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radio industry. In part, this meant more rapid consolidation. More importantly, as
Graham has noted, “the most enduring consequence of the [package-licensing] policy
was that it made it uneconomic for most other companies to do radio-related research,
because they could not recoup the investment. This left control of the rate and direction
of technological change in the radio industry largely in the hands of RCA. For RCA, the
effect was to make licensing fees the major payoff of its research activity. RCA was
effectively in the business of selling research” 11 (Graham 1986, p. 41). Thus in radio it
was not the case that an integrated path of learning within a large firm gave rise to
innovation; it was rather that innovation, channeled within a particular structure of
property rights, contained the path of learning within a single large firm. One might
indeed wonder whether, far from representing the optimum optimorum of capabilitybuilding, RCA’s integrated structure failed ultimately to tap the option value of what was
potentially a powerful modular architecture.
Sarnoff understood that, since the firm was not a cost leader and had essentially
no source of rents in the receiver value chain other than its patents, RCA needed to look
elsewhere for future sources of rents. This meant pouring money into research. It also
meant a move away from hardware to “software”: broadcasting and content. Taking over
the broadcasting assets of AT&T, RCA famously created the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC) in 1926, from which the American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
would eventually spin off in 1942.

11

On this point see also Reich (1977).
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Sound recording.
In addition, Sarnoff began to see the relevant architecture as one of “consumer
electronics” broadly rather than of radio as an appliance. 12 The core of all consumer
electronics in the era was the vacuum-tube amplifier, which could be linked to
electromagnetic speakers to reproduce sound. The amplifier could receive its input from
a radio tuner. But it could receive other inputs as well. At the system level, then,
consumer electronics in the age of sound was potentially highly modular, and at the high
end explicitly so. The principal source of input to an amplifier other than radio was of
course pre-recorded sound. In 1930, Sarnoff purchased the Victor Talking Machines
Company, a prominent maker of phonographs based on the techniques of Edison. 13
Initially, the phonograph was entirely mechanical: a needle picked up vibrations in the
tracks of a recording and a horn then amplified the sound acoustically. But as technology
advanced, it became possible to capture the vibrations electronically and transmit them to
a vacuum-tube amplifier. The research department at Western Electric (later to become
Bell Labs) developed electric sound recording in the early 1920s, but Victor initially
refused to adopt the technology. 14 A company called Brunswick was first to market with
an electronic phonograph it called the Panatrope. Sarnoff clearly understood the potential
of such technological convergence, and RCA began to offer not only electronic Victrolas
but also a device called the Duo Jr., a $9.95 record player that plugged into an existing
radio.

Smaller producers of audiophile equipment pursued an even more forceful

12

This paragraph and the next draw on Robertson and Langlois (1992).

13

At the same time, Sarnoff also engineered the sale of both GE’s and Westinghouse’s stakes in RCA,
thus bolstering the company as an independent entity (Chandler 2001, p. 22).
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modular strategy, offering (and often specializing in) separate amplifiers, pre-amplifiers,
tuners, phonographs, and speakers. A principal element of the standardized interface
within this modular system is still today called an RCA plug.
Because of the integrated structure of RCA, however, meaningful competition by
specialists was decidedly limited. But there did emerge one relatively integrated rival;
and one can argue that the ensuing competition did much to spur technological change in
the industry. Columbia began its life in the late nineteenth century as a distributor of
Edison’s phonographs and cylinders in the Washington, DC area (hence the name), and
by the 1920s was Victor’s principal rival in phonographs. Columbia also owned a small
network of radio stations that had formed as an outlet for talent snubbed by Sarnoff’s
NBC. In 1927, a young Philadelphia cigar maker called William Paley bought the whole
operation on the strength of his enthusiasm for radio advertising.

The Columbia

Broadcast System (CBS) competed with RCA’s networks and was also integrated into
phonograph records. 15 An excellent example of the benefits of Columbia’s competition
with RCA is the famous battle of the speeds. Adapted to the acoustic phonograph,
standard records of the time were made of shellac and spun at 78 rpm. The new
electronic technology suggested slower speeds and a new material, vinyl.

RCA

experimented with 33-rpm recording, but was unable to increase playing time
significantly and abandoned the project at the onset of the Depression. Columbia took up

14

Supposedly on the grounds that consumers were accustomed to the tinny sound of the Victrola and
would find the new sound unpleasant (Robertson and Langlois 1992, p. 330).

15

In fact, the Columbia record label had spun off from CBS after Paley purchased the Columbia
networks. Columbia merged with the British firm Gramophone (controlled by RCA) in 1931 to form
EMI, but, because of antitrust concerns, the American assets of Columbia were not part of the deal.
CBS eventually reacquried the Columbia label in 1938.
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the idea under the direction of Peter Goldmark and Edward Wallerstein, the latter the
erstwhile general manager of RCA’s Victor Division. As a result, Columbia stole a
march on RCA, whose attempt to retake the standard with the large-spindle 45-rpm disk
fell short. After World War II, phonographs adopted a gateway technology that enabled a
user to play records at all three speeds.

Television.
Advancements in radio and phonograph technology proceeded largely in modular fashion
through improvements in components. As many of these, notably vacuum tubes, were
general-purpose technologies, their manufacturers benefited from scale and learning
economies from demand – including military demand – outside of the consumer sector.
But the next big advance in consumer electronics required innovation that was much
more systemic in character.
Dating back to the nineteenth century, there had been numerous attempts to
transmit pictures. All of these required some kind if electromechanical apparatus, and the
results were never satisfactory. By the mid ‘twenties, Vladimir Zworykin was making
progress on a fully electronic method of scanning and transmitting images. His work
attracted Sarnoff’s attention, and RCA began funding the work, first at Westinghouse and
then at RCA’s own facilities. Whereas radio did not strictly depend on vacuum tubes and
could benefit from the independent development of tubes and other components,
television depended on the simultaneous development of a design architecture (for both
transmitter and receiver) and many new and specialized components, including highly
complex electron tubes. Moreover, television raised many more issues of technical
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standardization than had radio. Zworykin evidently believed that television could in fact
develop in an incremental, modular, and decentralized way (Graham 1986, p. 53), but he
grossly underestimated the resources that development would require. And, as the rapid
development of technology made early standard-setting problematic, it is likely that
Sarnoff was right to see the technology as an ideal fit with the model of the well-funded
industrial research laboratory.
Although entrepreneurial startups – like those created by Philo Farnsworth and
Alan B. Du Mont, who had invented technology parallel to Zworykin’s – did attempt to
develop television, it was more substantial enterprises like CBS, Philco, and Zenith who
provided a challenge to Sarnoff, even if these competitors were obliged to license much
of the technology from RCA. Far more than up-front costs, it was, however, the systemic
nature of the innovation in its early (or “pre-paradigmatic”) stages that created what
Chandler (2001, p. 25) refers to as barriers to entry. The initial dearth of programming
reduced television’s attractiveness to early adopters, as Sarnoff discovered after the first
RCA TVs rolled out at the 1939 World’s Fair. But RCA’s integration into a broadcast
network placed it a more favorable position than competitors, who had banded together to
push a standard different from RCA’s. At the behest of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), the radio manufacturers trade association formed the National
Television Standards Committee (NTSC), which, in 1941, promulgated standards largely
identical to those RCA favored.
TV broadcasting began in earnest later that year – just in time for the American
entry into World War II and the consequent ban on the manufacture of commercial
television equipment.

Nonetheless, the war proved immensely beneficial for the
- 20 -

development of the television. The military demanded technology closely related to that
used for television, notably the cathode-ray tubes crucial to radar. As a result, the end of
the war presented commercial industry with numerous advances in both product and
process technology, including techniques for mass producing cathode-ray tubes that
halved the post-war price of TVs (Graham 1986, p. 59). Component makers, working
with glass-making firms, continued the trajectory of improvement in product and process
after the war (Graham 2000, p. 144). A year after the war ended, RCA was selling a
mass-market TV set bundled with a contract for installation and service 16 (Graham 1986,
p. 60).
RCA encouraged competition in the production of sets, even to the extent of
holding technical seminars for competitors.17 This ought not to be surprising, as RCA
was in a position to benefit from its portfolio of television patents, its position as key
producer of a crucial bottleneck component (picture tubes), and its sale of complementary
“software” through the NBC network.

Indeed, in the early 1950s, NBC turned

handsomely profitable (Graham 1986, p. 60). In the period 1952-1956, RCA received
some $96 million in TV patent revenues – some 77 per cent of all industry revenues
(Levy 1981, p. 124) – which Levy (1981, p. 162) estimates to have raised the price of
televisions by 2.26 per cent. As it had in the case of radio, RCA licensed its TV patents

16

This was arguably the cheapest way to provide what consumers really want – reliable television
services – when technology is both unreliable and unfamiliar to consumers. Since reliability was the
central issue, and since knowledge of television technology was not widely diffused to independent
dealers, it was cheaper to provide such contracts through vertical integration (as RCA did) than
through contracts with independents.

17

“In 1947, Frank Folsom, then president of RCA Victor, invited representatives of all other television
makers to visit the RCA plant in Camden, New Jersey. He then proceeded to give them a tour of
RCA’s production facilities and presented each one of them with a copy of the blueprints for RCA's
most popular television model.” (Levy 1981, p. 129, citing Fortune, September 1948, p. 81.)
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(as well as its patents in other technological areas) as a package – until a 1958 antitrust
consent decree mandated a patent-pool among American (but not foreign) producers.
The American public adopted the TV with an enthusiasm that rivaled its earlier
infatuation with radio. Production ramped up to three million units by 1949, peaking at
7.79 million in 1955, and then declining slightly as the market for black-and-white sets
reached saturation (Levy 1981, p. 99). In 1950, five years after the War, nine per cent of
American homes could boast a television set; after 10 years, 64.5 per cent could; and by
1960, the figure was 87 per cent (Levy 1981, p. 116). Klepper and Simons (2000)
document the resulting flurry of entry of new firms into the market for black-and-white
TV. American manufacturers peaked at 92 in 1951, after which a shakeout reduced the
number to 38 in 1958. 18 Of these RCA and Zenith accounted for about a third of sales in
the ‘fifties, and the top four firms held more than half the market (Levy 1981, p. 86).
The move to color television required systemic innovations that were more
expensive and arguably more complex than those of monochrome TV, and the attendant
standardization issues were equally daunting. Here again, RCA took the lead (Levy
1981; Graham 1986; Chandler 2001). Systemic innovation of this sort was well suited to
RCA’s corporate research apparatus, which had grown in capability through war-related
research as well as commercial TV research. And, once again, RCA’s possession of
NBC reduced the coordination costs of launching a product with substantial network
effects. But, as happened in the battle of the speeds, CBS quickly emerged as formidable
competitor, having since added tube manufacture to its portfolio of broadcasting, records,

18

Klepper and Simons (2000) also show that the producers who survived the shakeout almost all tended
to be those with prior experience in radio.
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set assembly, and corporate research (Graham 1986, p. 61).

In 1947, Goldmark

petitioned the FCC to approve a partially mechanical system that CBS had been tinkering
with since before the war. RCA was at work on a fully electronic system compatible
with the existing black-and white standard, but the company couldn’t work out the bugs
fast enough to forestall FCC approval of the CBS system in 1951. Unfortunately for
CBS, however, the Korean war put a hold on production of color (but not black and
white) technology.

By war’s end, growth in black-and-white sales had made

compatibility a bigger issue; moreover, the likes of Zenith, Philco, and Philips much
preferred an all-electronic system.
Another NTSC convened, and RCA not CBS earned the imprimatur. The latter
slunk off to concentrate on broadcasting and records, leaving the field largely to RCA.
But the technology remained expensive and finicky, and RCA and was forced to absorb
high overheads in research, in production, and at NBC, overheads on which competitors
chose to free ride until color reached its tipping point. Unsurprisingly, the rate of
penetration of color TV was much slower than that of black-and-white: five years after
introduction, only half a percent of American homes had a color set; ten years after, only
2.9 per cent did (Levy 1981, p. 115). Nonetheless, RCA was eventually able to capture
rents from color TV through the production of sets, the sale of picture tubes (of which it
was initially the sole producer), and the broadcasting of color programs by NBC. 19

19

The 1958 antitrust consent decree limited RCA’s ability to collect rents from color TV patents, as
these became subject to a patent pool in which all comers could dip for free so long as they tossed in
some of their own patents (Levy 1981, p. 159).
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Figure 2
Net U. S. production and imports of television receivers, 1947-1978.
(Thousands of units.)
Source: Levy (1981, p 99).
Note: U. S. production includes units manufactured in the U. S. by foreign-owned firms.

So far we have seen evidence to support Chandler’s insistence on the importance
of integrated capability-building in large research-equipped multidivisional firms. Both
the monochrome and the color TV – if not, however, the radio – were systemic
innovations well suited to early development through strong corporate research; and all
three technologies partook of network externalities that could be partly internalized in an
integrated structure. But we have also seen evidence of the importance to technical
advance of vibrant competition and of innovation at the level of suppliers.

The demise of American consumer electronics.
The major integrated firms, notably RCA and Zenith, continued to provide most of the
product innovations in television through the 1970s (Klepper and Simons 1997, p. 421),

- 24 -

though much process innovation came from suppliers and from advances elsewhere in
electronics, like the wave-soldering techniques developed in connection with military
applications (Levy 1981, pp. 64ff; Klepper and Simons 1997, p. 428). As the technology
of television, including color television, began to mature in the 1960s and 1970s, RCA’s
rents from production of color picture tubes began to decline as other firms entered tube
production, and NBC’s early lead in color programming dissipated as all three networks
began broadcasting almost entirely in color. Advantage began to shift to those who could
produce receivers cheaply. And that increasingly meant foreign, especially Japanese,
firms. (See Figure 2.)
With the exception of Sony, which pursued a strategy of product innovation akin
to that of American firms like RCA and Zenith, most Japanese firms entered the
American market as low-cost producers dependent on American technology, notably that
of RCA (Levy 1981, p. 97). They concentrated on black-and-white sets, portable sets,
and private-label production for retailers like Sears, eventually moving up to higher-end
branded products.

Figure 2 understates the penetration of foreign firms into the

American market, as many “American” producers – indeed half of all American
producers in 1979 (Levy 1981, p. 82) – were actually subsidiaries of foreign (mostly
Japanese) firms. 20 By 1971, Sony had set up an assembly plant in California, with a
picture-tube plant to follow in 1974. In the same decade, Sharp and Hitachi also set up
de novo American facilities.

Meanwhile, many existing American producers were

gobbled up by foreigners. In 1974, Matsushita bought Motorola’s television business.
The same year Philips acquired Magnavox, and by 1981 had picked up the remnants of
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Philco and Sylvania. In 1976, Sanyo formalized its growing hold on Sears’s OEM
business by buying out Warwick, which had been Sears’s American assembler. In 1986,
the mighty RCA sold its television operations (including NBC) to its quondam parent
GE, which promptly swapped the electronics part for the medical-technology business of
France’s Thomson. Zenith, the last domino, fell in the early 1990s (Perry 1988).
Why? Chandler (2001) lays great stress on the strategic mistakes. RCA (and
other integrated American firms) strayed from the virtuous strategy technological
development and related diversification that would have maintained paths of learning on
which they had originally embarked. Instead, they succumbed to the temptation of
conglomerate diversification, thus ultimately destroying the integrated knowledge base
on which success depended.

It is certainly true that RCA went in for unrelated

diversification in a big way. The process began under David Sarnoff in 1966 with the
purchase of Random House and continued apace after the accession of David’s son
Robert to the helm of RCA in 1968. Acquisitions included golf equipment, car rental,
paper manufacture, frozen food, real estate development, and carpet manufacture.
Economists tend to be less inclined than historians or management scholars to see
strategy as an independent causative force, especially when all firms in the environment
seem to be adopting the same one. The strategy of massive unrelated diversification in
this reading is merely the proximate cause rather than the ultimate cause. As Michael
Jensen (1986) has taught us, unrelated diversification is one possible symptom of “free
cash flow,” corporate windfalls that allow managers to pursue their own interests and

20

The remainder of this paragraph draws on Levy (1981, pp. 109-110) and Chandler (2001, pp. 44-47).
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visions without the short-run discipline of product markets and financial markets.
Although it is not often remarked on, the heyday of the large American multidivisional
firm coincided with a period of relative economic isolation. The Depression, tariffs, and
wars of the first half of the twentieth century constitute what economic historians now see
as a massive collapse of nineteenth-century globalization (James 2001; Bordo, Taylor,
and Williamson 2003). And, with the destruction of the German, Japanese, and other
economies in World War II, that isolation continued for the better part of two decades. In
a general sense, then, the post-war golden age of the large multi-divisional American firm
was one in which competition was relatively relaxed by later globalized standards – and
in which managers found themselves with sources of free cash flow. The resulting
(relatively) slack environment not only encouraged diversification (as Chandler insists)
but also reinforced the multidivisional form itself, a form of which unrelated
diversification is the logical if extreme extension, and arguably isolated that form from
economic realities to which it was increasingly ill adapted (Langlois 2003, p. 370-371).
In the case of RCA, as we saw, free cash flow came importantly from patent
licensing. In addition, government, especially military, contracts came to prop up RCA’s
research laboratories, thus increasingly insulating them from contact with the market.
Both the post-war federal research climate and RCA’s own addiction to patent royalties
moved the labs in the direction of more basic research (Graham 1986, pp. 68-71).
Sarnoff believed that profit lay in continuing RCA’s founding strategy of staying abreast
of – or ahead of – all knowledge in electronics. Thus RCA’s ultimately disastrous foray
into digital computers.
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As Adam Smith might have predicted, however, this strategy would become
increasingly problematical as both the extent of such knowledge and the extent of the
market expanded after World War II. As technological leaders in electronics, American
firms found themselves with a broad menu of product and process options; and, because
of the ultimate limit of capabilities within even a large organization, those firms became
the prey of competitors who could pick off and specialize in pieces of technology or
market.

However valuable the integration-cum-research structure had been in the

generation of systemic innovations like television, it became a liability in a globalizing
world that could take advantage of outsourcing, low-cost production abroad, and withal
the option value of increasingly mature and thus relatively modular technology.
Moreover, for Japan in particular, specialization in production led to the creation of
technological, organizational, and institutional approaches (notably in miniaturized
electronic and electro-mechanical devices) that constituted a kind of general-purpose
technology that could be applied to newly emerging devices like video-tape and opticaldisk storage peripherals. Importantly, as we will see again presently, the diffuse focus of
American systems houses like RCA, GE, and Philco made it difficult for them to compete
with specialized American firms in the fabrication of semiconductor devices and with
Japanese firms in the incorporation of such devices into electronic systems (Klepper and
Simons 1997, p. 421).

Digital technology.
Even though semiconductors and computers were born in the years immediately
following the second world war, their institutional origins were quite different. The
invention of the computer involved both universities and direct government research
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funding.

By contrast, the transistor, the basic building block of the semiconductor

industry, emerged from private research at AT&T’s Bell Labs. Because of its success
and its secure status as the nation’s telephone monopoly, AT&T was able to pursue a
policy of research that, while arguably more focused toward commercial ends than basic
research at universities, was nonetheless willing to indulge basic science and to envisage
a research agenda quite far from commercial fruition.21

The transistor.
The Bell System was facing even more imminently the long-run problem that had
motivated the acquisition of the de Forest vacuum-tube patent: the difficulty of expanding
a switching system based on electromechanical relays. By the 1930s, Mervin Kelly, the
research director at Bell Labs, was voicing the opinion that electromechanical relays
would eventually have to be replaced by an electronic alternative in order to handle the
growing volume of traffic. William Shockley, one of the three Bell scientists to receive
the Nobel Prize for the transistor, was impressed by this observation, and believed that
the objective would be best realized with solid-state technology (Shockley 1976).
Bell Labs announced the transistor in December of 1947. 22 Almost immediately
transistor technology began spilling out to other firms. This was not, however, a process
in which slippery knowledge leaked unintendedly to others but rather a deliberate and
systematic attempt by AT&T to disseminate know-how through inexpensive licenses,

21

For a classic account of how the research environment at Bell Labs led to the transistor, see Nelson
(1962).

22

For detailed histories of the invention of the transistor, see Braun and Macdonald (1978), Morris
(1990), and Nelson (1962).
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technical symposia, and site visits (Tilton 1971, pp. 75-76; Braun and Macdonald 1978,
pp. 54-55). The main driver of this policy was the consent decree AT&T had just signed
with the Antitrust Division of the U. S. Justice Department, which specified how the
company was to treat technology outside the scope of the company’s primary mission. 23
But there is also reason to think that AT&T pursued a strategy of dissemination because,
like RCA in the case of color television, the company saw profit in the widespread
adoption of the technology. AT&T was still primarily concerned with the usefulness of
transistors to its own line of business, telephone switching. The company believed that if
it allowed access to the transistor, telephony would reap the benefits of spillovers from
the development of the capabilities of others in the electronics industry to an extent that
would outweigh the foregone revenues of proprietary development 24 (McHugh 1949;
Bello 1953; Braun and Macdonald 1978, p. 54; Levin 1982, p. 76-77).
Unlike the triode vacuum tube, which had been entangled in patent litigation and
then formed part of RCA’s onerous package licensing, the transistor became easily
available at relatively low royalties. The result was a large cohort of entrants (Mowery
and Steinmueller 1994). Existing producers of vacuum-tubes, as well as Bell Labs itself,
continued to be major sources of transistor innovations through the 1950s, especially in
the realm of process and materials. The work of this period led ultimately to a pivotal
innovation that did allow for rapid experience-based improvements and cost reductions:
23

AT&T’s strategy of dissemination may also have been motivated in part by a desire to preempt any
thought the military might have had of classifying the technology (Levin 1982, p. 58).

24

An AT&T vice president put it this way. “We realized that if this thing [the transistor] was as big as
we thought, we couldn’t keep it to ourselves and we couldn’t make all the technical contributions. It
was to our interest to spread it around. If you cast your bread on the water, sometimes it comes back
angel food cake.” Quotation attributed to Jack Morton, in “The Improbable Years,” Electronics 41:
81 (February 19, 1968), quoted in Tilton (1971, pp. 75-76).
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the planar process, a development arguably responsible for the increasing-returns
trajectory upon which the semiconductor industry now finds itself.

But the planar

process was not developed by Bell Labs or by any of the established vacuum-tube firms.
Instead, in a what would become a pattern characteristic of the American semiconductor
industry, the new approach was developed by a small start-up organization.
Among the many Bell Labs researchers who had struck out on their own in the
1950s was Shockley, who returned home to the San Francisco peninsula to found
Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories. Apparently prompted by dissatisfaction with the
company’s orientation toward product breakthroughs at the neglect of the commercially
richer area of process technology (Braun and Macdonald 1978, p. 84; Holbrook 1999),
eight of Shockley’s team defected in 1957, and, with the backing of Long Island
entrepreneur Sherman Fairchild, founded the semiconductor division of Fairchild Camera
and Instrument Corporation. The Fairchild group mounted an ambitious plan to produce
silicon mesa transistors using technology developed at Bell Labs (Malone 1985, p. 88;
Lydon and Bambrick 1987, p. 6). In attempting to overcome some of the limitations of
this transistor design, one of the eight defectors, Jean Hoerni, found a way to create a
device by building up layers on a flat surface — a “planar” device (Dummer 1978, p.
143; Braun and Macdonald 1978, p. 85; Morris 1990, p. 38). The planar structure made
it easy for Fairchild to devise a way to replace the mesa’s clumsy wires with metal
contacts deposited on the surface.
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By 1961, two Americans, Robert Noyce of Fairchild and Jack Kilby of Texas
Instruments (TI), had created prototype ICs. 25 Unlike Kilby, who had started with the
monolithic idea and then sought to solve the problem of fabrication and interconnection,
Noyce began with a process for fabrication and metallic interconnection — the planar
process — and moved easily from that to the idea of the integrated circuit. Under
pressure from the industry, TI and Fairchild forged a cross-licensing agreement in 1966
under which each company agreed to grant licenses to all comers in the range of two to
four per cent of IC profits (Reid 1984, pp. 94-95). This practice served to reproduce and
extend the technology-licensing policies of AT&T, again broadly diffusing the core
technological innovation to all entrants and thereby reasserting the principle that
innovative rents should flow to those who could commercialize and improve upon the
key innovation.
As important as the innovation of the IC was, the planar process is arguably the
more important technological breakthrough, not merely because it underlay the IC but
because it provided the paradigm or technological trajectory the industry was to follow. 26
By either etching away minute areas or building up regions using other materials,
semiconductor fabrication alters the chemical properties of a “wafer,” a crystal of silicon.
Each wafer produces many ICs, and each IC contains many transistors.

The most

dramatic economic feature of IC production is the increase in the number of transistors
that can be fabricated in a single IC. Transistor counts per IC increased from 10 to 4,000
in the first decade of the industry's history; from 4,000 to over 500,000 in the second
25

The idea of the integrated circuit was probably first propounded in 1952 by G. W. A. Dummer of the
British Royal Radar Establishment (Braun and Macdonald 1978, p. 108).
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decade; and from 500,000 to 100 million in the third decade. The ten-million-fold
increase in the number of transistors per IC has been accompanied by only modest
increases in the cost of processing of a wafer, and almost no change in the average costs
of processing the individual IC. This factor alone has been responsible for the enormous
cost reduction in electronic circuitry since the birth of the IC.

Electronic systems

comparable in complexity to vacuum-tube or transistor systems costing millions of
dollars can be constructed for a few hundred dollars, a magnitude of cost reduction that it
is virtually unprecedented in the history of manufacturing. The cheapness of electronic
functions has reduced the costs of electronic systems relative to mechanical ones and
lowered the relative price of electronic goods in general — developments that have had a
major effect on the industrial structure of the electronics and IC industries.
Langlois and Steinmueller (1999) have pointed to the critical role of end-use
demand in shaping industrial structure and competitive advantage in the world-wide
semiconductor industry throughout its history. In the early years, demand in the United
States came first from military sources and then importantly from the computer industry.
Government procurement demand proved so valuable to the development of the industry
not only because of its extent but also because of the military’s relative price-insensitivity
and its insistence on reliability (Dosi 1984). Commercial demand eventually grew more
rapidly than military, however, and, by the mid 1970s, government consumption had
declined to less than ten per cent of the market (Kraus 1971, p. 91).

26

Canonical sources here are Abernathy and Utterback (1978) and Utterback (1979).
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The American government also pushed the transistor and the IC through support
of R&D and related projects. But scholarship on the subject is essentially unanimous that
this activity was far less important for, and less salutary to, the industry than was the
government’s procurement role.

All the major breakthroughs in transistors were

developed privately with the military market (among others) in mind. And, although the
government tended to favor R&D contracts with established suppliers, notably old-line
systems houses like RCA, it bought far more from newer specialized semiconductor
producers (Tilton 1971, p. 91). The pragmatic policy of awarding work to those firms
that could meet supply requirements was particularly important for encouraging new
entry.
A significant feature of the transition to the IC was the virtual disappearance of
those vertically integrated American electronics companies that had led in the production
of vacuum-tubes. Although these firms had been able to stay in the race during the era of
discrete transistors, their market shares began to plummet in the era of the integrated
circuit. Why? Wilson, Ashton, and Egan (1980) point out that the new leaders were
either specialized startups or multidivisional firms (like TI, Fairchild, and Motorola) in
which the semiconductor division dominated overall corporate strategy and in which
semiconductor operations absorbed a significant portion of the attention of central
management. By contrast, the semiconductor divisions of the integrated system firms
were a small part of corporate sales and of corporate strategy, thereby attracting a smaller
portion of managerial attention and receiving less autonomy.
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The digital computer.
The history of the digital computer has much in common with that of semiconductor
technology, even if there are a number of important differences. Like the transistor, the
digital computer was developed with a specific bottleneck in mind. But, unlike the
transistor, the digital computer was developed not privately but at universities, with
explicit government subsidy from the start.
During World War II, the U. S. Army contracted with J. Presper Eckert and John
W. Mauchly of the Moore School at the University of Pennsylvania for a device
“designed expressly for the solution of ballistics problems and for the printing of range
tables” 27 (Stern 1981, p. 15). By November 1945, they had produced the Electronic
Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), the first fully operational all-electronic
digital computer — a behemoth occupying 1,800 square feet, boasting 18,000 tubes, and
consuming 174 kilowatts of electricity. Universities continued to play an important role
throughout the early life of the technology, helping to create the wholly new discipline of
computer science. Indeed, Rosenberg and Nelson go so far as to call the computer “the
most remarkable contribution of American universities to the last half of the twentieth
century” (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994, p. 331).
Government, especially military, support for the computer remained significant
throughout the 1950s, and government funding helped spur important technical
developments like ferrite-core memory, which emerged from the military-funded
Whirlwind project at MIT (Redmond and Smith 1980; Pugh 1984). But, as Bresnahan
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and Malerba (1999, pp. 89-90) argue, government research support had little to do with
the success of the commercial computer industry.

Moreover, much of government

policy, notably in the areas of R&D funding and antitrust, was actually aimed at
forestalling the emergence of IBM as a dominant “national champion” in computers. As
in semiconductors, however, the military’s pragmatic approach to procurement favored
those firms who could deliver the goods, and in computers that meant IBM (Bresnahan
and Malerba 1999, p. 90; Usselman 1993).
By the mid 1960s, however, IBM found itself riding herd on a multiplicity of
physically incompatible systems — the various 700-series computers and the 1400 series,
among others — each aimed at a different use.
software was becoming a serious bottleneck.

Relatedly, and more significantly,

By one estimate, the contribution of

software to the value of a computer system had grown from eight per cent in the early
days to something like 40 per cent by the 1960s (Ferguson and Morris 1993, p. 7). And
writing software for so many incompatible systems greatly compounded the problem. In
what Fortune magazine called “the most crucial and portentous — as well as perhaps the
riskiest — business judgment of recent times,” IBM decided to “bet the company” on a
new line of computers called the 360 series. The name meant to refer all the points of the
compass, for the strategy behind the 360 was to replace the diverse and incompatible
systems with a single modular family of computers (Flamm 1988, pp. 96-99). Instead of
having one computer aimed at scientific applications, a second aimed at accounting
applications, etc., the company would have one machine for all uses. This was not to be
27

In the event, the end of the war reduced the urgency of this goal, and the first major task given the
ENIAC was actually to perform calculations for the development of the hydrogen bomb (Stern 1981,
p. 62).
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a homogeneous or undifferentiated product; but it was to provide a framework in which
product differentiation could take place while retaining compatibility.
As Timothy Bresnahan suggests, the 360 was the first major computer platform,
by which he means “a shared, stable set of hardware, software, and networking
technologies on which users build and run computer applications” (Bresnahan 1999, p.
159). To put it another way, the 360 was a modular system, albeit one that remained
mostly closed and proprietary despite the efforts of the “plug compatible” industry to
pick away at its parts. Carliss Baldwin (2006) argues that IBM never understood the
tremendous option value implied in the 360 architecture. Had the company opened the
architecture up to the market while retaining control of key bottlenecks in the system,
they could have created considerably more value.
As the market for computers picked up speed, the symbiosis between computers
and semiconductors became stronger: competition among computer makers drove the
demand for ICs, which lowered IC prices by moving suppliers faster down their learning
curves, which in turn fed back on the price of computers, etc. The result was a selfreinforcing process of growth for both industries.

Indeed, the falling prices of

semiconductor logic fueled a second computer revolution, that of the minicomputer.
Minicomputers were smaller than mainframes and geared toward specialized scientific
and engineering uses. Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) , founded in 1957, was the
pioneer in the field. Among the other firms to enter the minicomputer market were
Scientific Data Systems, Data General (founded in 1968 by defectors from DEC), Prime
Computer, Hewlett-Packard, Wang, and Tandem (Flamm 1988, p. 131).
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Japanese challenge and American resurgence.
Japan had responded to American competitive advantage with high tariffs, and in
addition imposed quotas and registration requirements 28 (Tyson and Yoffie 1993, p. 37).
The Japanese government essentially forbade foreign direct investment, which forced
American firms to tap the Japanese market only through licensing and technology sales to
Japanese firms rather than through direct investment.
In Japan, the principal producers of transistors in the 1950s and 1960s were
diversified systems houses, including firms that had previously produced vacuum tubes,
rather than companies that were principally specialized into semiconductors. Moreover,
the main end-use for transistors in Japan was consumer products rather than the military.
But the Japanese vacuum-tube firms were much smaller than their American or European
counterparts at the beginning of the transistor era. As Tilton (1971, p. 154) notes, the
small size and rapid growth of the Japanese firms “also helped create a receptive attitude
toward change on the part of the [Japanese] receiving tube producers by reducing the
risks associated with new products and new technologies and by increasing costs, in
terms of declining market shares, to firms content simply to maintain the status quo.” In
many ways, then, Japanese systems firms faced many of the same constraints, and
adopted many of the same approaches, as the aggressive American merchant firms rather
than those of the American systems houses. The Japanese also sought licenses primarily
from the American merchants rather than the American systems firms.

28

This is in contrast to European policy, which featured high tariffs but no prohibition on foreign direct
investment. As a result, much of the European demand for semiconductors was satisfied by European
subsidiaries of American companies. Japanese companies have typically supplied some 90 per cent of
the Japanese semiconductor market, whereas American firms — through imports or foreign direct
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Despite their early success in transistors, Japanese firms found themselves in a
weak position by the 1970s. These firms were slow to make the transition to batchproduced silicon devices in the early 1960s, and, when they turned later in the decade to
the production of bipolar ICs, they could not compete with the likes of Texas Instruments
and National Semiconductor; some Japanese firms accused the Americans of “dumping”
(Okimoto et al. 1984, pp. 14-15). After 1967, indeed, the purchase of American ICs
created a Japanese trade deficit in semiconductors (Malerba 1985, p. 136).
How did Japanese industry move from this weak position in the 1970s to its
dominant position by the mid-1980s?

Until recently, the tacit assumption of most

commentators had been that Japanese success was the result of some combination of (1)
Japanese industrial structure, understood as superior to American industrial structure in a
very general or even absolute sense, and (2) Japanese industrial policy, understood as a
highly intentional — and even prescient — system of government-industry planning and
control.

Langlois and Steinmueller (1999) suggests a somewhat different picture.

Although both industrial structure and government policy played important roles in the
rise of the Japanese semiconductor industry, the benefits of that industrial structure were
far less timeless than commentators supposed, and the effects of government policy were
far less intentional, and perhaps somewhat less significant, than the dominant accounts
suggested.

investment — have supplied between 50 and 70 per cent of the European market (Tyson and Yoffie
1993, p. 34).
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As in the earlier rise of the American semiconductor industry, the pattern of enduse demand was crucial in shaping the bundle of capabilities that Japanese industry

End-use

United States

Japan

Western Europe

1982

1985

1982

1985

1982

1985

Computer

40

45

22

36

25

20

Telecommunications

21

10

10

13

20

29

Industrial

11

10

l7

6

25

19

Military and Aerospace

l7

18

0

0

5

7

Consumer

11

16

5l

45

25

25

Table 2
Demand for integrated circuits by end-use market,
United States, Japan, and Western Europe, 1982 and 1985, in percent.
Note: Includes captive consumption.
Source: OECD (1985).

possessed, as well as in narrowing and limiting the choices the Japanese firms had open
to them. In this case, that end-use demand came largely from consumer electronics and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, from telecommunications, especially purchases by NTT,
Japan’s national telephone monopoly. (See Table 2.) Consumer demand helped place
the Japanese on a product trajectory — namely MOS and especially CMOS ICs — that
turned out eventually to have much wider applicability. 29 Moreover, Japanese firms
adopted a strategy of specialization in high-volume production of one particular kind of
chip.

The DRAM, or dynamic random-access memory chip, is a technology that

benefited from increasing returns to scale not only because of the volume effects of mass
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production but also because it is arguably a general-purpose technology of considerable
importance — a device that can store digital information for a wide variety of purposes. 30
Established American firms, accustomed to providing customized devices, were
slow to recognize the cost-reduction advantages of a standardized memory chip (Wilson,
Ashton, and Egan 1980, p. 87; Dorfman 1987, p. 193). Two new firms —National and
Intel — quickly gained advantage over their established competitors in the merchant
market by moving more quickly into the production of high-volume standardized devices.
Both firms were spin-offs from Fairchild — two of the first of what came to be called the
“Fairchildren” (Lindgren 1969). In pushing standardized DRAM chips, however, these
firms precipitated a “memory race” in which Japanese firms were eventually to prove
dominant. American firms led in the early — 1K and 4K — DRAM markets. But an
industry recession delayed the American “ramp-up” to the 16K DRAM, which appeared
in 1976. Aided by unforeseen production problems among the three leaders, Japanese
firms were able to gain a significant share of the 16K market.

By mid-1979, 16

companies were producing DRAMs, and Japanese producers accounted for 42 per cent of
the market (Wilson, Ashton and Egan 1980, pp. 93-94). (See Table 2). The opportunity
opened for Japanese producers in the 16K DRAM market had proven sufficient for them
to advance to a position of leadership in the 64K DRAM.

Japanese dominance

accelerated in the 256K (1982) and one-megabit (1985) generations. Intense price
competition, combined with the general recession in the U.S. industry in 1985, caused all
29

MOS stands for metal-oxide semiconductor, and CMOS for “complementary” MOS.

30

DRAMs are “dynamic” in the sense that the electric charges containing the remembered information
decay over time and need periodically to be “refreshed.” This stands in contrast to the static RAM (or
SRAM), which does not require refreshing, but which therefore has disadvantages in size, cost, and
power consumption because it requires more transistors per memory cell.
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Device

Maximum Market Share (%)
United States

Japan

1K

95

5

4K

83

17

16K

59

41

64K

29

71

256K

8

92

1M

4

96

4M

2

98

Table 3
Maximum market share in DRAMs by American and
Japanese companies, by device.
Source: Dataquest, cited in Methé (1991, p. 69)

but two American merchant IC companies to withdraw from DRAM production 31
(Howell et al. 1992, p. 29). In 1990, American market share had fallen to only two per
cent of the new generation 4-megabit DRAMs. 32 (See Table 3.)
Why did the Japanese succeed? In broad terms, circumstances had staked out for
the Japanese industry a strategic path that fit well the existing competences of the firms
— namely those in mass production and quality control — and supported the thrust of
31

The exceptions were Texas Instruments, which produced in Japan, and Micron Technology, which
produced in Idaho.
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their final products, which, despite government efforts of to create a computer industry
(Fransman 1990), were still in consumer electronics and telecommunications.
Rather than feeling that they were on the verge of overtaking American
companies, the Japanese saw their computer industry as relatively weak against IBM, and
perceived that a key feature of IBM’s advantage was technology, specifically its position
in ICs. From the viewpoint of Japanese firms, the American IC industry was enormously
innovative but did not share much of the manufacturing culture that had developed in the
larger Japanese electronics companies, where quality, systematic capacity expansion, and
long term market position were regarded as key variables to control. The fact that
Japanese IC producers were large companies in comparison with their American
counterparts gave them one particular advantage: they were able to mobilize internal
capital resources to make investments in the IC industry in a way that U.S. companies
could not.
James March (1991) has pointed out that there is a necessary tradeoff between
exploration and exploitation — tradeoff between searching for new ideas and running
with the old ones. As the technology leaders, the American firms found themselves with
a full plate of alternatives to pursue, in both product and process technology. Sitting
somewhat behind the frontier, Japanese firms could pick one item off the plate and run
with it. Their morsel was the mass production of DRAMs.
American industry and politics certainly did not let these events go unnoticed, and
alarms went up as early as the 64K generation. More worrisome than the loss of the

32

These figures do not take into account the sizable captive production at IBM and AT&T.
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memory market was the possibility that Japanese dominance in DRAMs would be
translated into equal success in other kinds of chips. Although memories constituted at

60
50
40
America
Japan
Other

30
20
10

19
98

19
96

19
94

19
92

19
90

19
88

19
86

19
84

19
82

0

Figure 3
Worldwide semiconductor market shares (in percent), 1982-1998
Source: Semiconductor Industry Association.

most 30 per cent of the IC market, many believed them to be “technology drivers”
essential for continued progress in increasing the number of transistors on an IC. If
American firms couldn’t use DRAM production to develop and gain experience in the
next generation of technology, then Japanese producers would soon be able to climb up
the design-complexity ladder and challenge U.S. positions in logic markets (Ferguson
1985; Forester 1993).
In 1986, Japan’s overall market share in semiconductors slipped ahead of that of
the American merchants. Thus, in 1988 the U.S. industry appeared to stand on the brink
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of oblivion, with no haven in product or process that could be counted to insure its
survival into the 1990s. But the predicted extinction never occurred. (See Figure 3.)
Instead, American firms surged back during the 1990s, and it now seems the Japanese
who are embattled.
Langlois and Steinmueller (1999) argue that this resurgence is not the result of
imitating Japanese market structure and policy but rather of taking good advantage of the
distinctly American market structure and capabilities developed in the heyday of U. S.
dominance. Just as the innovation of, and the growing market for, the standardized
DRAM had favored the Japanese, another semiconductor innovation, and the burgeoning
market it created, came to favor the Americans. That innovation was the microprocessor,
an integrated circuit designed not to store information (like the DRAM) but rather to
provide on a single chip the information-processing capability of a digital computer.
In 1969, a Japanese manufacturer asked Intel to design the logic chips for a new
electronic calculator. Marcian E. (“Ted”) Hoff, Jr., the engineer in charge of the project,
thought the Japanese design too complicated to produce. The then-current approach to
the design of calculators involved the use of many specialized hard-wired circuits to
perform the various calculator functions. Influenced by the von Neumann architecture of
minicomputers, Hoff reasoned that he could simplify the design enormously by creating a
single programmable IC rather than the set of dedicated logic chips the Japanese had
sought (Noyce and Hoff 1981) By using relatively simple general-purpose logic circuitry
that relied on programming information stored elsewhere, Hoff effectively substituted
cheap memory (then Intel’s major product) for relatively expensive special-purpose logic
circuitry (Gilder 1989, p. 103). The result was the Intel 4004, the first microprocessor. A
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sixth of an inch long and an eighth of an inch wide, the 4004 was roughly equivalent in
computational power to early vacuum-tube computers that filled an entire room. It also
matched the power of a 1960s IBM computer whose central processing unit was about
the size of a desk (Bylinsky 1980, p. 7).
Intel gained an early lead in microprocessors that it never relinquished. Early on,
Intel did not push patent protection, and, in Hoff’s view, “did not take the attitude that the
microprocessor was something that you could file a patent claim on that covers
everything” (quoted in Malone 1985, p. 144). Because the microprocessor is a generalpurpose computer, there are many different ways to implement the microprocessor idea
without infringing on a particular implementation. And the appropriation of rents in
microprocessors has always depended on first-mover advantage rather than on patent
protection for particular features of the system design or on the ability to produce a
microprocessor that could not be emulated technically.
The microprocessor found uses in a wide variety of applications involving
computation and computer control. But it did not make inroads into the established
mainframe or minicomputer industries, largely because it did not initially offer the level
of computing power these larger machines could generate using multiple logic chips.
Instead, the microprocessor opened up the possibility of a wholly new kind of computer
— the microcomputer.

The personal computer.
The first personal computer (or microcomputer) is generally acknowledged to have been
something called the MITS/Altair, which graced the cover of Popular Electronics
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magazine in January, 1975. 33 Essentially a microprocessor in a box, the machine’s only
input/output devices were lights and toggle switches on the front panel, and it came with
a mere 256 bytes of memory. But the Altair was, at least potentially, a genuine computer.
Its potential came largely from a crucial design decision: the machine incorporated a
number of open “slots” that allowed for additional memory and other devices to be added
later. These slots were hooked into the microprocessor by a network of wires called a
“bus.” This extremely modular approach emerged partly in emulation of the design of
minicomputers and partly because hobbyists and the small firm supplying them would
have been incapable of producing a desirable (that is, more-capable) non-modular
machine within any reasonable time. In effect, the hobbyist community captured the
machine, and made it a truly open modular system. The first clone of the Altair — the
IMSAI 8080 — appeared within a matter of months, and soon the Altair's architecture
became an industry standard, eventually known as the S-100 bus because of its 100-line
structure.
The S-100 standard dominated the hobbyist world. But the machine that took the
microcomputer into the business world adopted a distinctive architecture, built around a
Motorola rather than an Intel microprocessor. Stephen Wozniak and Steven Jobs had
started Apple Computer in 1976, quite literally in the garage of Jobs’s parents’s house.
The hobbyist Wozniak, also influenced by the architecture of minicomputers, insisted
that the Apple be an expandable system — with slots — and that technical details be
freely available to users and third-party suppliers.

33

With the development of word

For a much longer and better-documented history of the microcomputer, see Langlois (1992), on
which this section draws.
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processors like WordStar, data-base managers like dBase II, and spreadsheets like
VisiCalc, the machine became a tool of writers, professionals, and small businesses.
Apple took in three quarters of a million dollars by the end of fiscal 1977; $8 million in
1978; $48 million in 1979; $117 million in 1980 (when the firm went public); $335
million in 1981; $583 million in 1982; and $983 million in 1983. 34
Existing computer companies were slow to develop competing microcomputers,
largely because they saw the machines as a small fringe market. But as business uses
increased and microcomputer sales rose, some computer makers saw the opportunity to
get a foothold in a market that was complementary to, albeit much smaller than, their
existing product lines. 35 By far the most significant entry was that of IBM. On August
12, 1981, IBM introduced the computer that would become the paradigm for most of the
1980s.
Ina radical departure, IBM decided to produce the machine outside the control of
company procurement policies and practices. Philip Donald Estridge, a director of the
project, later put it this way. “We were allowed to develop like a startup company. IBM
acted as a venture capitalist. It gave us management guidance, money, and allowed us to
operate on our own” (Business Week, October 3, 1983, p. 86). Estridge knew that, to meet
the deadline he had been given, IBM would have to make heavy use of outside vendors
for parts and software. The owner of an Apple II, Estridge was also impressed by the

34

Data from Apple Computer, cited in “John Sculley at Apple Computer (B),” Harvard Business School
Case no. 9-486-002, revised May 1987, p. 26.

35

Few people inside or outside IBM foresaw the sweeping changes the PC would make in computer
markets. In April 1981, four months before the official announcement of the IBM PC, IBM gave
presentations estimating it would sell 241,683 PCs over five years. In fact, IBM shipped 250,000 PCs
in one month alone (Zimmerman and Dicarlo 1999).
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importance of expandability and an open architecture. He insisted that his designers use
a modular bus system that would allow expandability, and he resisted all suggestions that
the IBM team design any of its own add-ons. Because the machine used the Intel 8088
instead of the 8080, IBM needed a new operating system. A tiny Seattle company called
Microsoft agreed to produce such an operating system, which they bought from another
small Seattle company and rechristened MS-DOS, for Microsoft Disk Operating System.
The IBM PC was an instant success, exceeding sales forecasts by some 500 per
cent. By 1983, the PC had captured 26 per cent of the market, and an estimated 750,000
machines were installed by the end of that year. The IBM standard largely drove out
competing alternatives during the decade of the 1980s. This happened in part because of
the strength of the IBM name in generating network effects, principally because it created
the expectation among users that the key vendor would continue to provide services long
into the future and that a wide array of complementary devices and software would
rapidly become available. But in large measure the “tipping” of the market to the IBM
PC standard was a result of the openness of the IBM system, which could be easily
copied by others, and the eagerness of Microsoft to license MS-DOS to all comers.
As it had with the 360/370 series, IBM had created a dominant computer
platform. But, in the case of the PC, the dominance of the platform would not translate
into a dominant market share for IBM. Because of the strategy of outsourcing and the
standards it necessitated, others could easily imitate the IBM hardware, in the sense that
any would-be maker of computers could obtain industry-standard modular components
and compete with IBM. A legion of clones that offered IBM compatibility at, usually, a
price lower than what IBM charged. By 1986, more than half of the IBM-compatible
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computers sold did not have IBM logos on them. By 1988, IBM's worldwide market
share of IBM-compatible computers was only 24.5 per cent. IBM's choice of an open
modular system was a two-edged sword that gave the company a majority stake in a
standard that had grown well beyond its control. For reasons that are debated in the
literature, but that likely have to do both with strategic mistakes by IBM and with the
inherently strong positions of key suppliers in controlling their proprietary “bottleneck”
technologies — the microprocessor and the operating system — Intel and Microsoft
gained control of the standard that IBM had originally sponsored (Ferguson and Morris
1993). The PC architecture is now often referred to as the “Wintel” (Windows/Intel)
platform.
Langlois (1992) has argued that the rapid quality-adjusted price decline in
microcomputers resulted not only from the declining price of computing power attendant
on successive generations of Intel processors but also from the vibrant competition and
innovation at the level of hardware components and applications software that resulted
from the open modular design of the PC. A decentralized and fragmented system can
have advantages in innovation to the extent that it involves the trying out of many
alternate approaches simultaneously, leading to rapid trial-and-error learning. This kind
of innovation is especially important when technology is changing rapidly and there is a
high degree of both technological and market uncertainty (Nelson and Winter 1977).
Moreover, the microcomputer benefited from technological convergence, in that it turned
out to be a technology capable of taking over tasks that had previously required numerous
distinct — and more expensive — pieces of physical and human capital. By the early
80s, a microcomputer costing $3,500 could do the work of a $10,000 stand-alone word-
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processor, while at the same time keeping track of the books like a $100,000
minicomputer and amusing the kids with space aliens like a 25-cents-a-game arcade
machine.
The personal computer grew rapidly in a niche that existing mainframes and
minicomputers had never filled. Quickly, however, the microcomputer’s niche began to
expand to encroach on the territory of its larger rivals, driven by the rapidly increasing
densities and decreasing prices of memory chips and microprocessors. In the early
1980s, a class of desktop machines called workstations arose to challenge the dominance
of the minicomputer in scientific and technical applications. As in the case of personal
computers, the workstation market was driven by open technical standards and
competition within the framework of what was largely a modular system (Garud and
Kumaraswamy 1993; Baldwin and Clark 1997).

Initially, these workstation used

microprocessors and operating systems different from those of personal computers. 36 By
the early 1990s, however, the same process of increasing power and decreasing cost
began pushing the Windows-Intel platform into what is today a dominance of the
workstation space.

At the same time, workstations hooked together (or hooked to

personal computers) began to take over many of the functions of larger minicomputers
and mainframes.

36

By the 1990s, networks of fast, cheap smaller machines were

So-called traditional workstations are built around Reduced-Instruction-Set-Computing (RISC)
microprocessors and run variants of the UNIX operating system. Intel-platform workstations use
high-end versions of the same microprocessors used in personal computers and typically run
Microsoft’s Windows NT or Windows 2000, which are compatible with Microsoft’s operating
systems for personal computers.
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widespread, a development accelerated by the spectacular growth of the Internet. 37 This
growth had a significant negative effect on the makers of larger computers, notably the
Boston-area minicomputer makers. Many went bankrupt; and, in a telling development,
the flagship maker of microcomputers — DEC — was acquired by Compaq, a maker of
microcomputers. Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996, 1997) refer to this encroachment of
smaller computers as the “competitive crash” of large-scale computing.
Former Intel CEO Andy Grove (1996) has famously described the evolution of
the computer industry as a transition from a structure of vertical “silos” in the days of
IBM and DEC to a horizontal structure today.

Once large multidivisional firms

undertook virtually all stages of production internally, and captured rents at the level of
the system. Nowadays computers – and electronics more generally – are the product of
multiple independent suppliers competing at every stage of production. Such competition
drives down costs and spurs modular innovation (Langlois and Robertson 1992). But,
because of the PC’s relatively open modular structure, the assembly of computer systems
themselves is not an obvious source of economic rent, and few assemblers prospered in a
consistent way. Compaq, which had gobbled up the remains of DEC, was itself eaten by
Hewlett-Packard. Gateway, an early mail-order success, has flirted with bankruptcy.
And, in late 2004, the originator of the IBM PC sold the entirety of its PC operations to
Lenovo of China (Williams and Kallender 2004). The one spectacular success has been
Dell Computer, which has been able to use the modular structure of the personal
computer to its advantage by making good use of the “external” capabilities of a
37

In some respects, the demand for large websites created by the Internet has spurred demand for large
central servers. Increasingly, however, even these servers are frequently networks of high-powered
personal computers rather than traditional mainframes or minicomputers.
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worldwide network of suppliers (Curry and Kenney 1999; Kraemer and Dedrick 2002;
Field 2004). More than any other major producer, Dell has abandoned the traditional
model of the integrated electronics firm in favor of what Baldwin and Clark (2006) call a
small-footprint strategy. Dell’s source of rents lies in not in any physical assets it owns
but rather in the way it organizes the PC value chain, including through its own
innovative logistics system.
Among suppliers, a principal beneficiary of the rise of the personal computer was
the American semiconductor industry. The abandonment of the DRAM market by most
American firms — including Intel — was a dark cloud with a bright silver lining. When
Intel led the world industry in almost all categories, it and many of its American
counterparts faced a full plate of product alternatives. With the elimination of mass
memory as a viable market, these firms were impelled to specialize and narrow their
focus to a smaller subset of choices. The areas in which American firms concentrated
can generally be described as higher-margin, design-intensive chips. For such chips,
production costs would not be the sole margin of competition; innovation and
responsiveness would count for more. And innovation and responsiveness were arguably
the strong suit of the “fragmented” American industry. As in the case of the personal
computer industry, the decentralized structure of the American semiconductor industry
permitted the trying out of a wider diversity of approaches, leading to rapid trial-anderror learning (Nelson and Winter 1977). And the independence of many firms from
larger organizations permits speedier realignment and recombination with suppliers and
customers. Building on existing competences in design (especially of logic and specialty
circuits) and close ties with the burgeoning American personal computer industry,
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American firms were able to prosper despite the Japanese edge in manufacturing
technology (Ferguson and Morris 1993).
The most important area of America specialization has been microprocessors and
related devices. 38 Between 1988 and 1994, a period in which merchant IC revenues grew
by 121 per cent, revenues from the microprocessor segment grew much faster than did
memory revenues (ICE 1998). This evolution of the product mix in the industry has
strongly favored American producers. In the microprocessor segment of the chip market,
American companies accounted for 72 per cent of world production in 1996, compared
with a 21 per cent share for Japanese companies. (See Figure 3.)

38

This segment includes not only microprocessors but also microcontrollers (less sophisticated
microprocessors that are used in embedded applications) and related “support” chips, such as memory
controllers, that are necessary to assembling a microprocessor system.
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Figure 4
Production of MOS microprocessors and related devices in 1996 (percent).
Source: ICE (1998).

The importance of the microprocessor segment has meant that a single company,
Intel, is responsible for much of the gain of American merchant IC producers. In 1996,
Intel accounted for 43 per cent of world output in the microprocessor segment. (See
Figure 4.) Intel’s strategy for recovery, begun in the 1980s, has proven remarkably
successful (Afuah 1998). In the late 1980s, the firm consolidated its intellectual-property
position in microprocessors by terminating cross-licensing agreements with other
companies and, more importantly, began extending its first-mover advantage over rivals
by accelerating the rate of new product introduction. These developments pushed Intel
into the position of the largest IC producer in the world, with 1998 revenues of $22.7
billion — more than the next three largest firms combined. (See Table 5.) Although
Intel dominates the microprocessor market, it is not entirely without competitors; and it is
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significant that its principal competitors in microprocessors are also American
companies, notably AMD and Motorola.
Another aspect of specialization that benefited the American industry was the
increasing “decoupling” of design from production, a result in this case of growth in the
extent of the market, which brought with it the development of computerized design tools
(Hobday 1991) and the standardization of manufacturing technology (Macher, Mowery,
and Hodges 1998). On the one hand, this allowed American firms to specialize in
design-intensive chips, taking advantage of a comparative advantage that arguably arises
out of the decentralized and “fragmented” structure of American industry. 39 On the other
hand, it also allowed many American firms to take advantage of growing production
capabilities overseas. This “modularization” of the semiconductor industry is spurring
the kind of decentralized innovation from which the personal computer industry has
benefited.
Another area in which American suppliers have prospered is, of course, software,
with Microsoft sitting prominently at at least one critical bottleneck. Effectively, the
personal computer relies for its modular structure on three major technological standards.
One involves the microprocessor, where, as we saw, Intel (and now AMD) control the
standard. Another involves the architecture of the “bus” along which the various pieces
of the computer communicate with one another; this is in the public domain, shepherded
by a committee of an industry trade group. And the third standard is the operating
system, which regulates how the hardware communicates with the higher-level (or
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“applications”) software that yields the services consumers ultimately demand. Here
Microsoft came to earn significant rents as first MS-DOS and then the Windows
operating system, over whose underlying code Microsoft owns copyright, became the
dominant technical standard. American firms also remain strong in other key segments
of the value chain, including disk drives (Kraemer and Dedrick 2002). And, although PC
production takes place in a global network of suppliers (Angel and Engstrom 1995),
American firms have in general retained those aspects of the production process requiring
high skill levels and paying high wages (Dedrick and Kraemer 2007, p. 22).

Convergence and conclusion.
By the mid 1980s, by most accounts, America had “lost” consumer electronics and was in
imminent danger of losing semiconductors and computers. 40 Contemporary analysis ran
within Chandlerian channels. Innovation and production both necessarily emanate from
large multidivisional firms. The leading American versions of these had either failed
(RCA) or were embattled (IBM), while Japan’s large multidivisional firms were on the
ascendant. Ultimate reasons were sought in the realms of culture and government policy.
If organization had a lesson, it was that American firms should become more like
Japanese firms.
As it has a habit of doing, however, history failed to conform to predicted trends.
The most striking development at the end of the electronic century was the convergence
of consumer electronics into digital technology.
39

As we saw, digital technology

Perhaps surprisingly, the mid-1980s — that dark period for American fortunes — was actually the
most fertile period in history for the startup of new semiconductor firms, by a large margin. Most of
these new firms were involved in design-intensive custom devices and ASICs (Angel 1994, p. 38).
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proceeded in important respects within an open modular framework in which specialized
American players were often better positioned than large multidivisional firms to capture
pieces of value. As digital technology developed, its various strands began to converge
and to encompass what had been consumer electronics. Coupled to the Internet and
cellular communications networks, the microprocessor has become the focal point for the
generation and transmission not only of “data” (as we used to understand that term) but
also of voice, music, text, and video.

Sometimes the microprocessor lies within a

conventional personal computer; but increasingly it is the core of a device that combines
the functions of a handheld computer, a phone, a camera, a music player, an arcade game,
and even a video player.
The network that produces such devices, their components, and the attendant
software (now increasingly broadly understood) is genuinely international, with
significant players in Japan, Korea, Europe, and elsewhere, notably China. But whereas
Japan was arguably the hotbed of innovation in consumer electronics in the 1970s and
80s – video-tape recorders and cameras, optical disks, and miniaturized devices like the
Sony Walkman – by century’s end the United States had regained a significant measure
of its stature in that field. At the turn of the millennium, Apple’s iPod was arguable the
signature device in converged digital consumer electronics.
What does all this imply? Paths of learning are not thoroughfares excavated by
large multidivisional firms with entourage in train. They have always been, and are
perhaps increasingly, trails beaten out by a variety of specialists working in cooperation
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And maybe even software (Cusumano 1991).
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and competition. The Chandlerian model works well for producing systemic innovations
in their early stages (television was a prime example) and occasionally for generating
fundamental new ideas (like the transistor).

But many if not most important

developments – from the vacuum tube to the planar process, from the radio to the
personal computer – were the product of specialists within the network. (The digital
computer was the product of a special kind of specialist, the university.) Moreover, by
taking advantage of a range of capabilities far wider than the boundaries of what even the
largest firm can encompass, a network of specialist suppliers and competitors is better
able to exploit the value of a complex and potentially modular product architecture.
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